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Organizational
Due Diligence:
The Key to Profitable Mergers and Acquisitions
More companies than ever
before are turning to mergers and acquisitions as a way to fuel growth for
the future. The volume of mergers and acquisitions completed worldwide in
1996 topped the $1 trillion mark. In the U.S. alone last year, 10,000 mergers
and acquisitions totaled $650 billion-nearly twice the dollar volume and the
number of deals of the peak deal-making years of the 1980s. 1996 also set
a record for the number of transactions worth $1 billion or more at more than
100.
The pace of mergers and
acquisitions is not expected to abate any time soon. So far in 1997, 26 billion-dollar
mergers have been announced, including at least a few "mega-mergers" such
as Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter and Banc One/First USA.
Mergers and acquisitions
as a competitive necessity
Why the frenetic pace
of merger and acquisition activity? For many companies, mergers and acquisitions
represent, quite simply, the fastest possible route to explosive growth. Banc
One, by purchasing First USA and its nationwide portfolio of 16 million card
holders, immediately gains a national platform in the lucrative credit-lending
business.
Some acquiring companies
seek to grow quickly by flowing more of the same products through a new sales
channel, as Gillette has done by purchasing Duracell International. For other
companies, formally aligning oneself with another company makes it possible
to enter lucrative new markets unavailable before, such as many U.S.- and
European-based automobile manufacturers have done in China and other Asian
countries heretofore closed to foreign car makers. For some other companies,
such as healthcare providers and utilities, mergers represent an opportunity
to achieve economies of scale and pare operating costs.
Other companies, such
as IBM, have suffered through painful restructuring and cost-cutting and look
to mergers and acquisitions to increase their capabilities and jump-start
growth. Alliances can make it relatively easy to acquire new technologies
or systems that are critical for competitive advantage. Many of the high-flying
technology leaders routinely snap up smaller companies that haven't earned
a penny of income solely for the promise a new invention may have for the
future. The critical nature of time-to-market makes the purchase of companies
whose technology is coveted more attractive than actually developing the technology
in-house
An increasing number
of companies are seeing mergers and acquisitions as an absolute prerequisite
to remain viable amidst a globalizing economy, where only the largest players
will survive. Raytheon, in successfully competing against Northrup Grumman
for the acquisition of Hughes Electronics, has positioned itself as a dominant
force going up against other recently-linked aerospace giants such as Lockheed
Martin/Loral.
Beyond mergers
and acquisitions
While the staggering
number of high-profile mergers and acquisitions makes the most prominent headlines,
other types of business alliances are also being struck in far greater numbers.
For example, partnerships and joint ventures have become more commonplace.
Virtual corporations are springing up in increasing numbers to exploit specific
time-sensitive opportunities, such as IBM, Motorola, AT&T and Loral collaborating
on a new PC chip with X-ray technology. Establishing value-oriented alliances,
such as the one Proctor and Gamble formed with WalMart which revolutionized
the retailing industry, has become the standard operating procedure for many
market leaders.
Wide-scale outsourcing
of entire areas of a company's operations-including the design and maintenance
of IT systems, manufacturing, marketing, human resources, training and sales-is
making more economic sense for companies that want to focus on their "core
competencies." Outsourcing of such selected operations, particularly those
once considered to be the company's "crown jewels," requires the same careful
evaluation and planning as mergers and acquisitions.
And they all looked
so good on paper...
Despite the best-laid
plans of company leaders who cut the deals, the majority of large-scale mergers
and acquisitions fell well short of financial projections. According to one
study, of 150 recent deals valued at $500 million or more, about half actually
destroyed shareholder wealth, and another third contributed only marginally
to it. A recently-completed 10-year study of 340 major acquisitions found
that total shareholder returns for 57% of the merged concerns fell behind
industry averages for three years after the merger.
In this paper, we offer
a new hypothesis as to the real reason so many alliances have fallen so short
of their promise and expectations. Most mergers and acquisitions fail not
because the pro forma projections were faulty, or that the terms and conditions
weren't well thought out, or that the premise for the alliance was fatally
flawed. The majority of such alliances fail because the up-front rigorous
analysis that was applied to the financial and legal aspects of the union
was not applied to the organizational aspects of the union. An "organizational
due diligence" is a key requirement for the success of any new alliance.
The focus for this paper
is mergers and acquisitions; however, many of our observations and recommendations
may be applied to other alliances. We explore some of the root causes of failures,
and provide a powerful new framework by which companies that are considering
a merger or acquisition -or undergoing one- can build a foundation for success.
We also provide some
practical recommendations and next steps based on our own experience working
with several of our clients who have undergone dramatic change as a result
of mergers and acquisitions over the last decade.
Learning from Failures
Given that so many of
today's mergers and acquisitions are regarded to be crucial for the long-term
success of both companies, why do so many falter? When so much time and money
is invested prior to the signing of the contract, why do so many unravel after
the ink is dry?
When the whole
is less than the sum of the parts - In
many cases, the synergies that sounded good in theory did not represent true
synergy at all. The high-technology industry provides some illustrative examples.
When Borland International Inc., a maker of languages, paid $440M for Ashton-Tate
in 1991, the then-dominant supplier of PC database software, the deal seemed
to represent a sure win for both companies. Both companies could manufacture,
market, sell and distribute their popular PC applications together, saving
considerable time and money. What Borland didn't know at the time was that
it was inheriting an extremely weak balance sheet from Ashton-Tate, along
with a set of products that by then had already become industry laggards.
Novell, a leading supplier
of networking software, snapped up several software companies in the early
90's, culminating with its most costly and ill-fated purchase of all in 1994:
the $855M acquisition of WordPerfect Corp., the developer of a word processing
program which by then was trailing Microsoft's industry-leading Word. Novell
had envisioned that with WordPerfect's word processing software, Novell could
offer a powerful alternative to Microsoft's integrated Office suite. Due to
a combination of marketing miscalculations and clashing corporate cultures,
the acquisition never brought a penny of profit to Novell. Today, Microsoft
enjoys more than 95% of the market for PC software "suites," while Novell's
share has plummeted to well below five percent.
Even deals that may represent
true synergy in some areas sometimes fall apart when synergy is lacking in
other areas. When German auto maker BMW bought Rover, Britain's last major
independent auto producer for close to $900M in early 1994, BMW beat rival
Mercedes-Benz in the race to create a new sports utility vehicle with the
four-wheel-drive Range Rover. BMW was able to quickly broaden its product
range and beat the competition in a key area. However, BMW had to invest far
more heavily in R&D than it had envisioned, given that Rover had depended
on former partner Nissan for engineering and design. The result: BMW's net
profits were cut by at least half after the acquisition.
"Unless you understand
the long-run strategic value of intent (of mergers and acquisitions), you
will grow frustrated when it proves-as it must-not to be a cheap and easy
way of responding to the uncertainties of globalization." ---- Kenichi Ohmae,
"The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances," Harvard Business Review, March/April
1989.
Focusing on financials
to the exclusion of all else - Few
companies would consider entering into any size merger or acquisition without
rigorous due diligence performed by a cadre of attorneys, bankers and media
relations firms-all of whom stand to reap significant financial gain if and
when the deal goes through. Most of these professionals are compensated, and
many quite lavishly, when the deal is consummated. However, nowhere on the
team is there an organizational specialist whose job is to perform a due diligence
on the fit of the two organizations, their business processes, and their cultures.
Repeatedly, companies
learn that despite the best-developed financial plans, it is the people who
make the alliance succeed or fail. Take the case of the Homedco Group and
Abbey Healthcare, two leading home healthcare companies, which merged to become
Apria Healthcare Group in the summer of 1995. Many hailed the merger as a
true union of equals. The new structure clearly favored the Homedco side for
key management positions, though this bias was not necessarily in the best
interests of the company, its customers, or shareholders. At first, the selection
process for top posts seemed fair, but then an imbalance soon became glaringly
apparent. Said one retired Abbey executive: "They said the best person would
prevail, but then they hired the people they knew. That's the way it always
is." A wrenching dismissal process prompted many Abbey employees to seek other
career opportunities. Many of the people who left went to the competition,
and are working together against Apria today. The company's stock value hovers
at about half of what it was when the merger first occurred.
What we have here
is a failure to integrate - Experience
has shown that the real deal-killer is the failure to effectively integrate
the two merging organizations. Good integration rarely makes a truly bad deal
work, but failure to integrate well almost always ruins the chances of even
the most financially promising union. Most often, the responsibility for implementation
is virtually "thrown over the fence" for the two companies to sort out. Sometimes
a transition leader or team is appointed, however, most times the leader and
team members are inexperienced or unschooled in many of the skills so critical
for an effective and efficient integration.
Let's look at some of
the areas where organizational integration is most critical, yet often overlooked.
When a clear, compelling
case for action is not communicated
When two companies are
considering a merger, rumors run rampant and fears abound. Which managers
will dominate? What will the new priorities be? Which products lines will
be kept and which will be cut? Will anyone be laid off? Who will be promoted
and who will be demoted? Will any plants or offices be closed? Will my skills
be valued by the new organization? Will I still have a job?
By failing to establish
and communicate a business case for the union, rumors and fears will soon
depress the best business opportunities. In lieu of a credible, clear and
mutually-beneficial case for action, employees-and frequently, customers-assume
the worst. And their assumptions are often well-founded.
Few companies take the
time to share with their employees why the union will make good business sense,
and how each organization is expected to contribute to the other's success.
Roles and responsibilities are left vague. The extent to which each company
is risking and being rewarded is unknown. Resentment and fear prevail over
trust and optimism. Top employees, who represent the true strength of the
organization, decide that their best interests would be served by leaving
the company.
When Electronic Data
Systems (EDS), a fast-growing giant in the IT consulting and outsourcing business,
merged in 1995 with A.T. Kearney, a successful management consulting firm,
many in both companies had difficulty understanding how a merger would work,
and why it was needed. The hierarchical, technology-driven approach of EDS
was at odds with the entrepreneurial style of Kearney. "But what really could
hurt [the merger]," according to the Wall Street Journal, "is the arrogance
and hubris that exists in every management consulting firm." Kearney consultants
didn't find the prospect of selling IT consulting services to be promising;
nor did many EDS salespeople relish the idea of suddenly having to promote
the benefits of management consulting services. EDS and A.T. Kearney management
did not make a compelling enough business case for the merger, and as a result,
many successful consultants from both companies left before, during and after
the merger.
When the blueprint
for change has major holes
Imagine an architect
focusing entirely on the cafeteria and customer conference room of a new office
building, and paying virtually no attention to the integrity of the design
of the building itself. Even if the cafeteria and conference room set new
standards for comfort, class and professionalism, the office building taken
as a whole will ultimately be unsuccessful.
Many companies likewise
focus only on some of the most obvious, or easiest, aspects of integrating
the two organizations, and avert their attention from equally important aspects.
For some, integrating the product lines, sales or service organizations takes
top priority. For others, it's merging plants, offices and geographic locations
to achieve increased market coverage or economies of scale. Rarely is the
entire business system of the two combined organizations considered in total
and planned for.
Clashes of culture
can unravel the whole
Cultural clashes are
frequently at the root of many misguided mergers and acquisitions. While the
business case for the merger of discount warehouse leaders Price Club and
Costco seemed strong in the Fall of 1993, the cultural differences undermined
the merger. Observed analyst Michael J. Shea of Carter Investment Group: "The
Price guys had... a real estate strip-mall mentality. The Costco guys were
the type who started bagging groceries...and worked their way up the ladder."
The two companies maintained separate headquarters and sharply different management
styles, and broke up in less than 12 months. Said one analyst: "The best thing
to happen to that marriage was the divorce."
Differences between corporate
cultures are difficult enough to overcome, but when differences between national
cultures also come into play, the challenges increase exponentially. That
said, companies are attempting cross-border mergers and acquisitions in record
numbers. In 1996, the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions jumped
to 6,377 from 6,113 in 1995, with the combined value rising to $296 billion,
from $226 billion in 1995.
Take the recent merger
between Upjohn Co. of Kalamazoo, Michigan, and Pharmacia AB of Sweden. Both
were second-tier players fighting for survival amid a world of global drug
giants, with complementary strengths and markets. The expected result: A global
drug company whose whole was far greater than the sum of the parts. Few predicted
the obstacles cultural differences would pose.
The cultural differences
appeared in many areas. The Swedes chafed at the idea of having to write frequent
detailed reports, which was the American norm; Americans resisted when the
Europeans opposed Upjohn's policy of drug and alcohol testing of employees.
Americans frequently scheduled meetings that bumped up against the Europeans'
extended summer vacation schedules. In Pharmacia's Italian business center,
wine was poured freely in the company dining room, while in the boardrooms,
humidors were stuffed generously with fine cigars. At Upjohn, alcohol and
smoking were strictly banned at all facilities, though eventually that prohibition
was relaxed in Europe.
Management styles presented
the greatest differences. The Swedes were used to an open system, where small
teams work autonomously and make decisions. The Americans followed a command-and-control
management style. Though it's too soon to tell how successful the merger may
eventually be, CEO John Zabriskie departed abruptly in early 1997; many believe
the Europeans simply could not accept his "hard-charging American management
style."
When the leaders
are not prepared to lead
Most executives have
little experience melding together two entirely different organizations. And
experience, it seems, does contribute to success. Close to three-quarters
of companies that have completed six or more deals of at least $5 million
have yielded returns above the industry average, compared to just 55% of companies
that closed fewer than five such transactions.
Percy Barnevik, who heads
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a Swedish-Swiss engineering giant, applies a "30%"
rule to the business he acquires. He allocates 30% of central staff to independent
profit centers, 30% to operating companies, and gets rid of 30% entirely;
only 10% are left in head office. Like many leaders experienced with mergers
and acquisitions, Barnevik makes concessions to win over the employees of
the newly acquired companies. For example, when he first merged Asea, his
Swedish engineering group, with Brown Boveri, a Swiss company in the same
business, he established his headquarters in Zurich rather than Stockholm
to make the operation look less like a takeover.
Often the leaders of
the merger have vastly different management styles and objectives. These differences
can thwart even the most promising deals. Many observers are watching the
Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter deal to see if the CEO and president can work together.
Dean Witter's Philip Purcell, named as the new firm's CEO, is known for his
slow, steady approach, while Morgan Stanley president John Mack-now holding
the number two post-is known for his sense of urgency and impatience. Observed
one journalist: "Mr. Purcell faces difficult decisions. The direction in which
he takes the company will be influenced by his own need for control and his
qualities of innovative leadership. Above all, he must not be ambiguous."
A foundation for
a successful integration
If so many of the biggest
and-allegedly-brightest of mergers and acquisitions have failed to live up
to their promises of profitable growth, what can companies do differently
than the ones that came before to ensure success?
To ensure a successful
acquisition or merger, companies should do these four things well:
Perform
a due diligence assessment of the organizations (before the deal is cut)
Create
a vision and blueprint for the new combined organization
Develop
a shared plan of action
Learning
from past experiences
Due diligence analysis
of the organizations
When an acquisition is
first considered and a candidate company has been selected, acquiring companies
normally do a due diligence assessment of the candidate company's markets,
products and financial condition. It is at this time we recommend an assessment
also be done of the candidate company's business system - it's processes,
organizational structure and capabilities, its information and management
systems, and its cultural norms. The condition of the candidate company's
business system and its fit with the business system of the acquiring company
should be a major consideration in the deal.
Two companies considering
a merger should also perform a due diligence assessment of their business
systems. Are they compatible? Do they compliment each other? Will the whole
be greater than the sum of the two systems? Will the combined business system
meet the objectives of the merger?
A structured process
should be used to make the data gathering and analysis fast and efficient.
An experienced, two-to-three person team should visit the candidate company
and gather data first-hand on its business system. This data should then be
analyzed, and a recommendation made to the business team responsible for the
merger or acquisition. Particular attention should be paid to the objectives
of the merger or acquisition. Experience shows that the candidate company
must have compatible cultural norms and sufficient strengths in its business
system to compliment the business system of the merging or acquiring company.
Companies that thoroughly
evaluate the cultural incompatibilities of their respective organizations
ahead of time are rewarded for their foresight. For example, Southwest Airlines
spent two months exploring its cultural compatibility with Morris Air before
buying the smaller rival in 1993. This enabled the two companies to comfortably
shave two years off of the planned integration process. Computer Associates,
which has bought more than 50 businesses over the last two decades, invests
considerable time understanding the cultural differences prior to making a
purchase decision, and takes steps to ensure that any such differences are
resolvable.
Creating a common
vision and shared blueprint
For a merger to succeed,
both companies should have a common vision of the organization that will result
from the merger. They must see the new enterprise as a way to create new value
and open doors for expanded opportunities in the future. Both should be clear
on the intended benefits and have realistic expectations of the timeframe.
Most mergers and acquisitions take far longer to yield hoped-for benefits
than anyone had predicted at the outset. When there are unrealistic expectations,
frustration and disappointment can easily derail integration efforts.
The newly-formed Lockheed
Martin, widely predicted to be a success by all measures, is dedicated to
one overriding mission: Winning and executing a targeted piece of the business
by combining capabilities from various parts of the company. The goal is to
develop a seamless organization in which formerly different businesses act
as one entity. Effectively, Lockheed Martin will redesign itself for every
major program the company targets. This will be a strong competitive advantage.
All the attention to
detail in the world, pre- or post-merger, will not produce a successful union
if the strategic vision behind it is flawed, or if the vision one company
holds is dramatically different from the other.
The vision of the merging
companies should also include a holistic and well-balanced business system
(sometimes called the Business Diamond - see Figure 1 below). An organization's
business system consists of its:
Business
processes
Structure,
jobs and skills
Information
systems
Culture,
norms and beliefs
Systems for
managing the performance of employees
Figure 1 - Business System or Business "Diamond"
Companies that successfully
merge their business systems have a blueprint to guide them. The blueprint
addresses and resolves the following questions:
Jobs, Skills and
Organizations:
What
jobs are affected by the new organization? Which responsibilities will
be expanded, and which will be constricted?
Whom
will report to whom?
Where
are our organizations compatible? Incompatible?
What
organizational structure can best support the new alliance?
What
capabilities are present, which are missing, and which are duplicated?
What
new skills and knowledge will be required?
Business Processes:
What
work will we continue to do, and where will it get done?
How will
existing business processes be merged?
Which
process of each organization will be used, or will a new process be
designed?
How can
we best create value for customers in everything we do?
Information and
Information Systems:
What
value is placed on information technology today?
How will
IT support the alliance?
What
information will be required to enable the new organization to succeed?
How and
with whom will information be shared, both within the organization and
with customers, suppliers and other key stakeholders?
How will
future needs for IT be fulfilled? What will be the IT strategy?
Culture, Norms
and Rules:
Who are
the key stakeholders in this alliance?
What
do they perceive to be true about the past, present and future?
How compatible
are the current cultural norms?
What
cultural barriers are likely to be show-stoppers? Who will be responsible
for managing the converging cultures?
What
are the greatest anticipated areas of resistance?
What
values take precedence over all others? What principles are unshakable?
What
will our communications emphasize?
Management Systems:
How are
employees managed today?
Are they
managed differently within the merging organizations?
What
performance metrics and tracking system will we use in the new organization?
What
types of compensation, incentives and recognition programs will reinforce
desired behaviors, from executives to line employees?
How will
our management systems be modified to encourage people to support the
merger?
What
about recruitment? Succession planning? Appraisal systems?
Developing a shared
plan of action
Once a vision and a blueprint
for the union has been established, which takes into consideration important
organizational differences and strategic objectives, the process for integration
must be clearly defined and communicated, early and often.
Here are some important
steps companies must take to ensure a successful integration. While it is
tempting to forego some of these steps in favor of "quick results," there
are no short-cuts. Circumventing any of these steps is likely to put the success
of the merger or acquisition at risk.
Clarify
who will lead the new entity early on. Spell out roles and responsibilities
of key executives. Build and demonstrate strong personal relationships
and mutual trust among key executives. For some companies, such as Price/Costco,
it was this failure to clarify leadership roles, and refusal to delegate
authority to one leader, that led to its hasty demise.
Appoint
an experienced leader for the integration effort. Make sure that
the individual or team has experience in complex integration efforts.
Lotus, Digital Equipment Corporation, Powersoft, and other "partner-rich"
companies have senior executives who are dedicated to alliance management.
Many are equivalent in status to the CFO or HR director.
Involve
key managers and employees from both organizations at the outset.
Blended integration teams help relieve anxiety over which organization
will dominate the other, and which set of managers and culture will prevail.
On the day Chemical Banking Corp. announced its merger with Chase Manhattan
in August 1995, it unveiled a policy council comprising 22 individuals
from both banks. Teams hammered out which systems and strategies would
survive. Said one Chase vice chairman: "From day one, we said we were
not going to foist one culture over the other."
Build
broad connections with multiple linkages at all levels. Don't
confine the process of integration to just a few people. Involve employees
at all levels by soliciting input, sharing ideas, and creating new workflows
that encompass employees from both companies as early as possible. Success
requires frequent rapport-building meetings at multiple levels. As one
executive said: "It is often the personal relationships built that enable
you to manage across the rough spots." At Ford and Mazda, the top executives
meet for three days every few months. The first two days are all
business, but the third is always set aside for getting to know each other
personally. Twice a year, the heads of product and planning meet, as do
the production and product engineering vice presidents. In between, there
are hundreds of joint planning sessions.
Communicate,
communicate, communicate. Fully exploit all forms of communication,
including surveys, face-to-face meetings, newsletters, bulletin boards,
retreats, focus groups, video conferences, telephone, email, and intranet
workgroup forums. Not all employees will be enamored of the union. Anticipate
problems, fears and likely areas of resistance, and design communication
plans accordingly. Constantly solicit ideas, advice, problem identification
and resolution from all stakeholders, including employees, customers and
suppliers.
Determine
how stakeholders should be managed and measured. Craft a performance
evaluation and compensation system that fosters cooperation and the merger
of cultures. At Chase-Chemical, for example, the bank introduced a salary
review process that measures, among other things, how well each employee
lives up to core values such as teamwork and responsibility for one another.
Connect the fates of all affected stakeholders and cement the relationship
by rewarding mutual success.
Understand
how customers are likely to be affected. Many customers fear that
mergers and acquisitions will compromise the product or service quality,
its price, and the overall relationship they have enjoyed with a company.
Develop a customer-centered integration plan that takes into account all
areas where customers are most likely to be affected, positively and negatively,
and take steps to ensure that all negative consequences are minimized
or eliminated. Promote the positive consequences of the merger to customers,
and to salespeople and others who have front-line responsibility for customer
relationships. One leading database software provider recently purchased
a significant part of a large computer company's database business. For
at least nine months after the transaction, neither buyer nor seller thought
to communicate the ramifications of the acquisition to customers. As a
result, they are struggling to regain some key customers they lost.
Start
a project early in the integration process in which people from the two
organizations can work together. Pick a project that is easy to
do and can be completed quickly. Create shared objectives and realistic
milestones. An early success in this project will help promote enthusiastic
participation later on, when projects become more complex and time-consuming,
and stakes are higher.
Learning from each
experience
The company that learns
with each integration, whether as a result of a merger or acquisition, a joint
venture, or a major outsourcing deal, will be far better positioned to take
advantage of the next opportunity that comes along. How can learning be encouraged
and shared throughout the organization?
Document
the experience of those who have done alliances before, especially
when things haven't gone as smoothly as planned. Figure out why things
went well, and not so well.
Regard
each partner as both teacher and learner. Even when one company is
clearly the dominant player, both companies can learn from each other.
Cultivate an environment of learning, and reward efforts to share experiences.
Encourage
creativity and innovation. Every union is unique. While previous experience
can help pave the way for success, look at each integration as an opportunity
to do things better and smarter.
Summary
Mergers and acquisitions
can fail for any number of reasons. Sometimes the economic reasons are unsound;
other times the hoped-for synergies fail to materialize. An important determinant
for a successful union lies in the ability and discipline to perform a "due
diligence assessment" of the two organizations and to conceptualize a balanced
and winning business system that can be created out of the union. Studying
and planning only one or two important aspects, such as the company culture
or the distribution system, presents only a piece of what must be managed.
It is the total picture that must be envisioned and developed as part of the
integration effort.
There is no silver bullet
or magical formula. It takes discipline, openness, trust, respect for each
other's strengths, and experienced, capable leadership. It also takes time.
But imagine the time and money wasted, and the windows of opportunity lost,
in the many mergers and acquisitions that have failed because this kind of
organizational due diligence was not done.
Kendall Consulting
Group helps its clients to navigate their way through successful mergers and
acquisitions, partnerships, joint ventures and other alliances. Kendall Consulting
Group's clients are in a range of industries and include Fortune 500 multinationals,
and a number of small- to medium-sized companies. For more information, please
call 978-474-9109 or 941-366-1774 or email info@kendall-consulting.com.
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